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The Canadian constitutional history and its determinants 
di Edmondo Mostacci 
Abstract: La storia costituzionale canadese e le sue determinanti – The essay analyses 
the Canadian constitutional history and focuses on the key-elements that have most influenced 
the development of Canadian constitutional law. In particular, it highlights how the québécoise 
question was the first and fundamental determinant of the constitutional order of the Nation. 
Subsequently, the suggestions coming from the United States and above all the question of 
independence from the Motherland played an equally significant role. However, the québécoise 
question re-emerges strongly when the process leading to independence from the United 
Kingdom comes to a positive end. 
Keywords: British North America Act, Canada, Federalism, Multiculturalism, Patriation. 
1. Introduction: Canadian constitutional history and Canadian constitutional 
law 
The analysis of Canadian constitutional history is no easy task, for two distinct 
reasons: firstly because of the difficulty of reconstructing a perspective that covers 
a period of time particularly long and difficult to define with certainty; secondly, 
for some features of the relationship that links constitutional law, constitutional 
history, and history tout court of the Country. 
As for the first question, it is difficult to establish the starting point of the 
analysis, due to the absence of a real breakpoint within the historical development 
of Canada. On this point there seem to be three distinct alternatives.  
The first in chronological order is to identify as the starting point of the 
constitutional history of the Country the adoption by the King of France of the 
edict that established the Supreme Council of Quebec1. This is not, in fact, the first 
governing body of “New France”. Already in 1647 the French monarch had 
provided the North American colony with a first council consisting of three 
members. However, it is only with the edict in question that ancient Quebec was 
endowed with a governing body with a certain degree of autonomy and significant 
powers.  
The second alternative is the most common one within Canadian 
constitutional history studies and coincides with Britain’s victory over France in 
the Seven Year War and with the Royal Proclamation of the 7th of October 1763. 
It is definitely the passage that marks the cuts more clearly. From this moment 
                                                                  
1 Edit de création du Conseil souverain du Québec. 
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on, two of the most significant forces that led to the constitutional development of 
Canada begun to deploy their effects: the difficult coexistence between 
Francophones and Anglophones and the complex relationship of colonies with the 
British motherland.  
The third alternative is to set the time when Canadian constitutional history 
begins – rectius, the perspective of analysis that is proposed on this topic – in 1867, 
the year of the adoption of the British North America Act. Several good reasons 
support this choice. The BNA defines some essential features of the Canadian legal 
order, as we know it today. In particular, it is only since 1867 that Canada is a 
federal legal system. At the same time, the features of the act influence markedly 
the subsequent constitutional development and the problems it has left 
unresolved.  
Numerous reasons militate in favor of each of the three alternatives and do 
debar a decisive choice in favor of  one or them. On the contrary, the complex 
character of Canadian constitutional history suggests that each of these three 
moments of transition is to be relativized. Consequently, the analysis that will take 
place in the following pages will have the specific object of Canadian constitutional 
development over the last 150 years, also in light of the subject of the conference. 
However, particular attention will be given to those events prior to the adoption 
of BNA that have to some extent significantly influenced the development of 
subsequent events.  
As for the link between constitutional law, constitutional history and history 
tout court, the question concerns some essential features that Canadian 
constitutional law has derived from that of the ancient Motherland. In particular, 
similarly to what happened in the English experience, the normative formant of 
Canadian constitutional law is at the same time rather weak and fragmented. On 
the one hand, its weakness manifests itself in the partiality of the Canadian 
Constitution, especially before the adoption of the Canadian Act of 1982: the 
absence of a constitutional bill of rights is associated with the lack of constitutional 
provisions concerning important features of the frame of government. 
Consequently, the overwhelmingly prevalent part of the BNA relates to relations 
between Federation and Provinces. On the other hand, the same definition of the 
normative formant seems to be problematic in nature. Even after the adoption of 
the Constitutional Act 1982, whose sect. 52.2 defines what the Constitution of 
Canada is, the issue remains controversial, even in the light of New Brunswick 
Broadcastiong Co. v. Nova Scotia where the Supreme Court claims that the acts 
listed in the sect. 52.2 constitute a non exhaustive list. Moreover, even where the 
normative formant is complete, its application by courts - and in particular, until 
1949, by the Judicial Commitee of the Privy Council - is largely influenced by 
historical circumstances and gives rise to a Law in action far from the Law in the 
books. 
The peculiarities of the relationship between law and constitutional history 
hinder a clear distinction between these two domains and require dealing with the 
historical discourse differently from the simple analysis of the diachronic evolution 
of juridical institutions of constitutional law, to grasp its current conformation. 
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To this end, it seems appropriate to have a grid of analysis of Canadian 
constitutional history focusing on those fundamental forces that have driven the 
historical development of Canadian institutions. This grid is then applied to the 
analysis of the most important aspects of the Canadian legal system in their 
diachronic development.  
This grid is made up of the following three elements: the contrast between 
the French-speaking and the Anglo-speaking inhabitants; the relationship 
between the Dominion and the Motherland; the ties with and cultural influences 
from the Motherland and the United States. The aim of the research is to verify 
how they have intertwined and how the dialectic between the two main forces – 
i.e.: the contrast between the French and the Anglo-speaking, and the relationship 
between the Dominion and the Motherland – has constituted the fundamental 
tension underlying the overall Canadian constitutional development. 
Based on this grid the analysis will take up the following main points: first, 
the period prior to the adoption of the BNA will be analyzed, highlighting how 
the relationship with the Motherland (para 2) and the francophone issue (para 2.1) 
have influenced the development of Canadian institutions. Next, we will analyze 
the time when the BNA was adopted (para 3) and the subsequent steps on the path 
of Canada’s independence from the United Kingdom (para 3.1). Finally, before 
moving on to final observations (para 5), attention will be focused on the 
Patriation process (para 4) and to the Constitutional Act of 1982 (para 4.1). 
2. Representative government and political autonomy from the Québec Act 
to the BNA 
The first determinant of Canadian constitutional history is the long relationship 
between Canada and the United Kingdom. This begun with the Treaty of Paris2 
and the subsequent Royal Proclamation (1763)3 and lasted over two centuries until 
the end of the process of Patriation. It was not, as is well known, a constant 
relationship. On the contrary, it has produced a long evolution that over the 
decades has presented problems of different origin and nature. 
In the beginning, the theme that drove the historical development was that 
of Canadian autonomy and representative government. The Royal Proclamation 
of 1763 replicated to a good extent a scheme already tested - over a century before 
- with the “other” American colonies. After the treaty of Paris, George III 
established a new government for Québec by means of a letter-patent4. The letter-
                                                                  
2 The treaty was signed on 10th of February 1763 by the kingdoms of Great Britain, France 
and Spain, after the victory of Great Britain during the Seven Years’ War and marked the 
beginning of an era of British dominance outside Europe. On the Treaty, see H.W.V. 
Temperley, The Peace of Paris, in J.H. Rose, A.P. Newton, Ernest Alfred Benians (eds), The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. I – The old empire from the beginnings to 1783, 
Cambridge, 1929. 
3 The Proclamation was issued on 7 th of October 1763, by King George III. 
4 On this instrument and its use in the context of British colonization of North America, see 
T.S. Hughes, The History of England, from the Accession of George III, 1760, to the Accession of 
Queen Victoria, III ed., vol I, London, 1846, 20 ff. See also G.F. Ferrari, Le libertà. Profili 
comparatistici, Torino, 2011, 70 ff. 
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patent entrusted a Governor with the power to summon general assembly in such 
manner and form as was usual in those colonies and provinces which were under the King’s 
immediate government and, with the consent of the representatives of the people, to 
make laws and ordinances for the peace, welfare and good government of the 
Colony5. 
This first constitutional arrangement, which was unsatisfactory under 
several points of view, lasted eleven years, until the adoption by the Parliament of 
Westminster of the Québec Act 17746. According to this Act, the Government of 
the province was entrusted to a Governor and a Legislative Council; the Council 
was composed by no less than seventeen and no more than twenty-three members, 
appointed by the crown. As a consequence, the act left no room for representative 
government7. However it addressed an other issue relevant to the political 
autonomy of the Colony: it restored the validity of French civil law within the 
Colony8. 
The enactment of the Québec Act of 1774 did not resolve the question of 
representative government and during the ’80 petitions and memorials were 
presented to the home government9. Within a context characterized by the 
American and the French revolution, petitions and memorials pushed the 
Parliament of Westminster to approve a new constitutional text in 1791. The 
Constitutional Act of 179110 dealt with the question of representative government 
and vested the legislative authority in a Legislative Council – composed by 
members appointed by the crown for life – and an Assembly – composed by 
representatives chosen by majority of votes in electoral districts.  
Whilst the Constitutional Act dealt with the issue of representative 
government, it did not tackle the question of ministerial responsibility11. The 
governor general, appointed by the Crown, and his Executive Council were 
entrusted with the executive power and were not responsible to the Legislative 
Assembly.  
The framework described did not undergo significant changes for more than 
half a century, despite the fact that, after a first relatively harmonious period of 
operation, political frictions between the Legislative Assembly and the Governor 
General had rendered unsatisfactory the rendering of the overall institutional 
system.  
A decisive change of course took place in the mid-nineteenth century, a 
period that was turbulent in Canada since the adoption of the Union Act of 184012 
and that was characterized, in Europe, by the revival of revolutionary revolts of 
liberal inspiration. The innovations of the period concerned two distinct areas. On 
                                                                  
5 See S.J. Watson, The Constitutional History of Canada, Toronto, 1874, 16. 
6 Formally the British North America (Quebec) Act of 22nd of June 1774 (14 Geo. III c. 83). 
7 See A.R. Hassard, Canadian Constitutional History and Law, Toronto, 1900, 31 ff. 
8 See J.G. Bourinot, A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada. From the Earliest Period to 
1901, Toronto, 1901, 11. 
9 See again A.R. Hassard, Canadian Constitutional History, cit., 39-40. 
10 The Clergy Endowments (Canada) Act 1791 (31 Geo 3 c 31). 
11 See again J.G. Bourinot, A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada, cit., 15. 
12 The British North America Act, 1840 (3 & 4 Victoria, c.35). 
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the one hand, they enlarged the field of autonomy granted to Canadian 
representative institutions: in 1846, an imperial statute entrusted the Canadian 
legislature with the complete authority over taxes and provincial money and 
authorized it to repeal duties imposed upon goods imported from foreign 
countries; three years later, the Parliament of Westminster repealed the 
navigation laws and liberalized the use of the river St. Lawrence; moreover, in 
1854 another act enacted by the Imperial Parliament enable the Canadian 
legislature to alter the structure of the Canadian Legislative Council and paved 
the way to an elective upper house for the Province13.  
Furthermore, the Executive Council was made responsible to the Legislative 
Assembly. As Lord Elgin was appointed Governor General in 1847, he received 
clear instructions to receive as members of the Executive Council “those persons 
who might be pointed out to him as entitled to do so by their possessing the 
confidence of the Assembly”14.  
2.1. The issue of French-speaking inhabitants 
The second determiner of Canadian historical development, both in the period 
before the adoption of the BNA and afterward, is the contrast between English 
and French speaking inhabitants. In fact this is a contrast that emerges about 
thirty years after the Capitulation of Montreal, when after the American 
Separation War a large group of citizens of the Thirteen Colonies who has remained 
faithful to the Motherland came to the colonies of the northernmost part of North 
America. It was a massive migration for the time, estimated at about 60,000 people, 
one fifth of whom moved to the northwest of Québec15. As far as the previous 
period is concerned, however, it is more correct to talk about the opposition 
between the population settled in the Canadian area during the French domination 
and the new Anglo-Saxon dominion.  
The issue of this opposition emerges first of all in the Articles of Capitulation 
of Montréal, in which England is committed to ensuring the people of the future 
Canada the privilege of maintaining their civil rights and practicing their 
religion16. However, in the early years following the Royal Proclamation, the new 
Motherland seems to fail to comply with the commitment because the decision to 
provide the colony of Anglo-Saxon institutions and the choice to impose Anglican 
oath as a condition for access to Public office, which inhibited the French-speaking 
people of Catholic religion from actively participating in the public life of the 
Colony17.  
A first change of route in the sense of greater protection of the demands of 
the French-speaking population comes with the Québec Act of 1774, which not 
only restores the validity of civil law in disputes between individuals - albeit with 
                                                                  
13 See A.B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Oxford, 1912, 645. 
14 Cfr. J.G. Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure and Practice in the Dominion of Canada, IV ed., 
Toronto, 1916, 12-3 
15 See C.G.D. Roberts, A History of Canada, London, 1897, 257 ff. 
16 See art. 27. 
17 See J.G. Bourinot, A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada, cit., 7. 
Edmondo Mostacci  Saggi – DPCE online, 2019/1 
ISSN: 2037-6677 
630 
some interference with common law, in force in the sphere of public law - but 
purges the oath of allegiance, necessary for access to public office, of every 
reference of a confessional nature. 
A second step on the path to stabilizing the francophone issue is with the 
adoption of the Constitutional Act of 1791, which divides the Colony into two 
provinces – Lower Canada, characterized by a French-speaking majority, and 
Upper Canada, with an Anglo-speaking majority – and provides each province of 
symmetrical18 and mutually independent governing bodies. The separation of the 
two provinces affects their legal structures and allows the population of Upper 
Canada to substitute the French civil law with the rules of common law19, thus 
inaugurating that territorial differentiation that characterizes also the current 
Canadian legal system.  
After a period of relative stability, the institutional system created in 1791 
gets into crises because of the demand, common to both provinces, of greater 
autonomy, especially in tax matters. However, the impasse is particularly severe 
in Lower Canada where it stands up with the difficult relationship between the 
French population and the Motherland. The former, through its representatives, 
requires the adoption of important reforms aimed at giving the province greater 
autonomy and a truly representative government, as summarized by Ninety-Two 
Resolutions of 183420. The second is reluctant to grant greater forms of autonomy 
and eager to proceed to the Anglicization of the province. The contrast between 
Lower Canada and the Motherland is progressively dramatized in the first thirty 
years of the nineteenth century resulting first in a conflict between the electoral 
chamber and the governor general, who «dissolved the Québec Legislative 
Assembly with a frequency unparalleled in political history»21, and then in the 
presentation of the Ninety-Two Resolutions by Canadian representatives and in 
their rejection by the British Institutions. The peak of the crisis eventually leads 
to the Rebellion of 1837-38, to the suspension of the Constitutional Act of 1791 
by the Parliament of Westminster and the sending of Lord Durham22 to Canada 
as Commissioner, entrusted with large powers for the adjustment of certain important 
affairs, affecting the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada.  
Returning to the Motherland, Lord Durham submits to the English 
Parliament an articulated report23 outlining the state of Canadian provinces and 
suggesting the actions needed to resolve the ongoing crisis. The action lines 
suggested by Lord Durham are essentially two: to proceed on the road to grant 
                                                                  
18 Except the fact that Upper Canada is administered by a Lieutenant-General of the 
Governor-general, while Lower Canada by a direct representative of the latter. 
19 See F.P. Walton, Civil Law and the Common Law in Canada, 11 Jurid. Rev. 282, 286 (1899). 
20 A.R. Hassard, Canadian Constitutional History, cit., 47. 
21 According to J.G. Bourinot, A Manual of the Constitutional History of Canada, cit., 24. 
22 On Durham’s figure and his political views, see M. Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1945, 
New York (NY), 1955, 175 
23 The s.c. Lord Durham’s Report. It could be found in 4 Monthly L. Mag. & Pol. Rev. 85 (1839). 
On the Report, see T.J. Lockwood, A History of Royal Commissions, 5 Osgoode Hall L. J. 172, 
188 (1967). 
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greater autonomy to Canada and to strengthen self-government institutions24; for 
the other to strengthen ties with the Motherland, in particular also through the 
Anglicization of the French-speaking province25. Based on this premise he 
strongly recommends the unification of the two provinces in a single entity 
governed by common institutions.  
Based on Durham’s report, several initiatives were taken26. On the one hand 
those that give rise to the developments already seen in the previous paragraph; 
on the other hand, the approval of the Act of Union of 1840, with which Upper 
and Lower Canada are reunited in a single province, divided into two districts.  
The institutional framework laid down by the Act of Union is characterized 
by the readaptation, at least in the form, of the one already laid down for the two 
provinces in the Constitutional Act of 1791, with the peculiarity that the two 
chambers of the legislature are now composed of two parts, each of them respective 
to one of the two districts in which the unified province is organized.  
In short, the period ending on the eve of the BNA approval saw the existence 
of a Canadian province whose autonomy from the Motherland had made a number 
of advances. Simultaneously, these same advances were partially offset by a 
reasonable solution to the problem of the self-government of the French-speaking 
population, which first found a partial solution in the division of the territory in 
Upper and Lower Canada and then was largely expunged from the political agenda 
of the Parliament of Westminster.  
3. The enactment of the British North America Act 
In the years immediately preceding the adoption of the BNA, Canada shows an 
institutional framework that gives the Colony an adequate level of autonomy from 
the Motherland: legislative power is in the hands of a Legislature that, since 1856, 
is composed of elective representatives; Executive power is in the hands of an 
Executive Council responsible to the representative Assembly. In this context, in 
1865 the Imperial Parliament enacts a law of particular importance in 
rationalizing and better defining the relations between Motherland and 
Dominions: over the years the general relationship between the Imperial 
Parliament and Legislature of the Dominions has been reconstructed in terms 
similar to the concept of hierarchy. The Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 
(CLVA) intervenes to clarify this relationship and to state what acts of the imperial 
parliament are to prevail over the laws adopted by the colonies and which acts are 
not binding27. The CLVA sets out that an Imperial Statute is an act of the 
Parliament of Westminster extending to the colony by the express words or necessary 
                                                                  
24 C.R. Cahow, Comparative Insights into Constitutional History: Canada, the Critical years, in 45 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 33, 45 (1982). 
25 W. Renwick Riddell, The Constitutional History of Canada, in 46 Am. L. Rev. 24 36 (1912) 
26 However it must be highlighted that the British government adopted only a part of the 
Durham’s proposal. In particular, it granted responsible government to Canada only in 1847. 
See W. Morton, The Canadian Identity, Toronto, 1972, 38. 
27 On the act ant its impact on Dominion-Motherland relationships, see A.B. Keith. Dominions 
as Sovereign States: Their Constitutions and Governments, London, 1938, 167. 
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intendment and prescribes that colonial laws are void when they are repugnant to 
an imperial statute. As a consequence, colonial laws are valid even when they are 
repugnant to other statutes (s.c. received statutes) or common law rules.  
While the twenty years before the adoption of the BNA create a positive 
settlement of relations between Canada and the Motherland, the francophone issue 
seems far from having found a positive accommodation. An attempt to do so is 
made within the Canadian political system thanks to the principle of the double 
majority28: no act affecting the territory of a district can be approved without the 
consent of – other than the two chambers – the majority of the representatives 
assigned to the same district. At the same time, when in 1848 the principle of 
ministerial responsibility begins to be applied, the principle of double majority 
implicates that the two districts should be equally represented in the 
government29.  
However, the principle of the double majority, applied to the formation of 
the Executive Council, ends up weakening the government and making it a target 
for dialectics between Anglo- and French-speaking components of the Country, 
with consequences also affecting the normal functioning of the legislative power30. 
In addition, the more general historical context increases the need for a well-
structured institutional system31 and the urgency of addressing the weakness of 
the Canadian frame of government. In particular, two circumstances are of 
particular relevance. On the one hand, the socioeconomic evolution of Canada and, 
more generally, of the western world32; on the other hand, the American Civil 
War, which raises concerns about the prospective expansionism of the United 
States33, on the backdrop of what had already happened in the early nineteenth 
century, and determined the need to balance the cumbersome north American 
Country with a likewise strong legal system, with the contribution of the other 
British provinces in North America. 
                                                                  
28 See A.R. Hassard, Canadian Constitutional History, cit., 59, and O.D. Skelton, Canada under 
responsible government, 1854-1867, in J.H. Rose, A.P. Newton, Ernest Alfred Benians (eds), The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VI – Canada and Newfoundland, Cambridge, 1930, 
343 ff. 
29 See B.K. Baker Long, R. Chaffey, Framework of Union. A Comparison of Some Union 
Constitutions, Cape Town, 1908, 16. 
30 The principle of the double majority was found to be unworkable, according to A.R. 
Hassard, Canadian Constitutional History, cit., 59. See also D. Creighton, The 1860s, in J.M.S. 
Careless, R. Craig Brown (eds), The Canadians 1867-1967, MacMillan, 1969, 8. 
31 See R. Vipond, 1867: Confederation, in P. Oliver, P. Macklem, N. Des Rosiers, The Oxford 
Handbook of the Canadian Constitution, Oxford, 2017, 84. 
32 The Second Industrial Revolution (1850-1880) affected also the northern part of the 
American Continent and required an institutional framework capable of providing the nascent 
industrial system with the necessary infrastructures. See D.G. Creighton, British North 
America at Confederation: A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial 
Relations, Ottawa, 1938 7. 
33 After the Trent Affair the relationship between the U.S. and the British Empire became 
particularly tense. See W. R. Riddell, The Constitutional History of Canada, in 32 Can. L. Times 
225, 241 (1912). Few years later, the Campobello Island and the Niagara Raids showed that a 
political union among British colonies «was necessary to ensure territorial integrity against a 
military power wanting to punish Britain for its support of the South» (R. Vipond, 1867: 
Confederation, cit., 87). 
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In 1864, this critical circumstance drives the leaders of both government and 
opposition to agree to a mutual understanding, in order to deal with the 
institutional problem. The perspective to make a federal system with New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia34 leads to a coalition government35. A first convention 
in Charlottetown decides to inspect the question of a larger union of the North 
America British Colonies in a specific conference to be held in the Ancient Capital 
of Québec. As a result, after a eighteen days conference in October 1864, the 
representatives of the Colonies draft seventy-two resolutions, as an outline of the 
future Act of Union. The legislature of Canada scrutinizes the seventy-two 
resolutions at the beginning of 1865 and, after an in-depth debate, addresses them 
to her Majesty so that a measure will be subject to the Parliament of Westminster. 
After a new conference in London (1866), where small adjustments to the seventy-
two resolution are made to accommodate specific interests of the maritime 
colonies, on the 12th of February 1867, a Union Bill is submitted to the Imperial 
Parliament and enacted without (significant)36 amendment within two weeks. On 
the 29th of March the British North America Act receives the Royal sanction from 
Queen Victoria.  
In the process of drafting37 the Seventy-two Resolutions, the two driving 
forces of Canadian constitutional history do not cease to play a significant role. 
However, if the steps taken towards autonomy in the previous decades allow the 
fundamental terms of the relationship with the Motherland to remain now 
unaltered, the francophone issue shows intact all its historical significance. In 
addition, a new and different force comes into play: it is the dialectic between 
British cultural influences38, the importance of which is heightened by the need to 
involve the Imperial Parliament in the overall process, and the influence of the 
legal U.S. culture. It is evident that the eighty years of experience of the first 
federal legal system has to be seen as a fundamental comparison term for 
constituents of the new Canadian federal order.  
By proceeding with order, the establishment of a federal order allows first 
to find a balance between the instances of autonomy of the French-speaking 
population and the needs of the Motherland to bridle Quebec self-government 
within a broader framework, able to preserve the positioning of this geographical 
area within the British colonial empire. At the same time, it also allows to preserve 
the interests of the Anglo-speaking population not only in the Upper but also in 
Lower Canada, especially those of economic nature. Here, then, the dialectics 
                                                                  
34 The idea of gathering in a single federal state the British colonies of North America had 
emerged about a fifteen years earlier (see P. Buckner, The Maritimes and Confederation: A 
Reassessment, in 71 CHR 1 (1990)), even if the political conditions to concretely pursue the 
design were realized only in the sixties. 
35 Composed by the Liberal and the Conservative Party of Upper Canada and the Conservaties 
of Lower Canada). 
36 See N. Mcl. Rogers, The Compact Theory of Confederation, in 9 Can. B. Rev. 395 (1931). 
37 On this process, see A.P. Poley, Federal Systems of the United States and the British Empire: 
Their Origin, Nature and Development, Boston, 1913, 191. 
38 See M.D. Walters, The British Legal Tradition in Canadian Constitutional Law, in P. Oliver, 
P. Macklem, N. Des Rosiers, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution, cit., 113 ff. 
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between the Anglophone group and the Francophone group moves at the Québec 
conference on future relations between provinces and federation and, in particular, 
on the distribution of competences between the two levels of government. On the 
one hand, representatives of the Anglo-speaking population imagine a more 
perfect union stronger than the United States: the federation is endowed with a 
broad supremacy clause against provincial laws and the clause on residual 
competences is addressed to the federation; at the same time, competences 
expressly assigned to the federal legislature have a mere exemplifying character; 
in addition, in the field of economic relations, the federation is attributed a 
seemingly wider competency – the regulation of trade and commerce – than that 
attributed by the U.S. constitution to the Federation (to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations and among the several States). The French-speaking delegation, on 
the other hand, tries to oppose a certain resistance to pervasive federal power in 
order to maintain a higher level of autonomy, and in any case succeeds in getting 
provincial powers on property and civil rights, in order to maintain and develop 
its legal system of civil law.  
But in terms of the dialectic between the influences of English and US legal 
cultures, it would be misleading to be driven by a mere quantitative criterion: 
considering the need to maintain the bond with the Motherland and to obtain the 
approval of the imperial parliament, it is natural that British influence remains 
dominant. Thus, not only the form of government continues to recall the English 
one, but also some of its fundamental rules remain entrusted to constitutional 
practice and customs, in accordance with the legal sensibility of the Motherland. 
Likewise, the constitutional text is not accompanied by a bill of rights able to 
restrict the parliamentary sovereignty.  
On the contrary, US legal culture strongly influences the federal structure 
of the legal system ruled by the BNA, both in positive and negative ways. On the 
one hand, the U.S. federal system is the archetype that inspired the Seventy-two 
Resolutions; on the other hand, the majority of Canadian founding fathers want to 
avoid the weaknesses that have affected the first decades of life of the U.S. 
Federation and have contributed to triggering the Civil War39: the choice of 
orienting in favor of the federation the residual clause and the choice of providing 
for a pervasive supremacy clause in favor of the federation are explained in this 
way. 
3.1. A slow development towards independence (1867-1949) 
At least from a symbolic point of view, the adoption of BNA marks an important 
moment in the process of progressively releasing Canada from the Motherland. 
The focus on the representative government theme and the completeness of the 
federal-style institutional system drawn from the act leave little room for 
colonialist regressions. Similarly, the sect. 129 of the BNA reiterates the capacity 
of the Canadian government to intervene in all matters of interest to the extent 
possible, with the limitation of imperial statutes, as established by the CLVA of 
                                                                  
39 See R. Vipond, 1867: Confederation, cit., 89. 
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186540. From a legal and formal point of view, there are still two elements of 
supremacy of the Motherland on the Dominion. Firstly, the possibility for the 
Parliament of Westminster, admitted by the CLVA, to adopt imperial statutes 
capable of constraining the Canadian political decision maker; furthermore, the 
role of appellate jurisdiction of the Judicial Commitee of the Privy Council (JCPC). 
These are two elements that will only be overcome in the course of the twentieth 
century.  
The power of the Imperial Parliament to adopt imperial statutes, from a 
formal point of view, is expected to remain in force until the end of the patriation 
process in 1982. However, it lost its substance at the beginning of the thirties with 
the Statute of Westminster of 1931.  
The process leading to the adoption of the Statute – an act affecting United 
Kingdom relations with all the Dominions – lies at the end of World War I: on 
the one hand, in the international context, the principle of self-determination of 
peoples, emphatically enunciated by U.S. President Wilson at the Versailles 
Conference (1919), shows the anachronism of the colonial claims of the States of 
the old continent. On the other hand, the participation of the British colonies in 
the war effort, costing to Canada more than 60,000 casualties, is a persuasive 
argument for parity between Dominions and the Motherland. In this context, the 
first announcement of a new course comes in 1920, when the Canadian Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King denies assisting British troops in Turkey 
without the approval of the Canadian parliament41. Some years later, in 1926, the 
King-Byng crisis puts the issue of independence from the UK at the center of 
public debate42. In particular, Prime Minister Mackenzie King declines the issue 
underlying the crisis not as much as a frame of government problem, but from the 
perspective of political relations between Canada and the crown, its representative 
in Canadian soil and, therefore, with the Motherland. In addition, in the same year, 
the Privy Council declares null and void a 1888 federal statutes, which has 
abolished appeal to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in criminal cases, due 
to its inconsistency with two imperial statutes and the CLVA of 1865.  
These (and other) events caused pressures from the governments of the 
Dominions to address the issue of relations with the UK, which led to the 
convening of the Imperial Conference of 192643. The meeting of the Prime 
Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions therefore adopted the 
Balfour Declaration, according to which the UK and the Dominions «are 
autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way 
subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs».  
The Balfour Declaration declares the principle of parity between the 
Dominions and the (ancient) Motherland, but still leaves unsolved the problem of 
                                                                  
40 On the relationship between CLVA 1865 and BNA, see A.B. Keith, Responsible Government 
in the Dominions, Oxford, 1928, 342. 
41 On the relationship between “Dominions” foreign policy and the sunset of the British 
Empire see F.R. Scott, The End of Dominion Status, in 38 Am. J. Int’l L. 34 (1944). 
42 On the importance of this crisis, see A.M. Dodek, Rediscovering Constitutional Law: Succession 
upon the Death of the Prime Minister, in 49 U.N.B.L.J. 33, 48 (2000). 
43 See J.A.R. Marriott, Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth, London, 1939, 300. 
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the hierarchical relationship between the Imperial Statutes adopted by the 
Parliament of Westminster and laws adopted by the legislature of Commonwealth 
countries. The issue is dealt with a few years later during a new Imperial 
Conference, which adopts an agreement that, while formally enforcing the 
supremacy of the Imperial Statutes, aims to resolve the issue pragmatically44: the 
Imperial Conference of 1930 adopts a convention according to which «no law 
hereafter made by the parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend to any of 
the said Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the 
request and at the consent of that Dominion». At the same time, the Conference 
recommends the formal adoption of this principle by the Parliament of 
Westminster through an Imperial Statute. The imperial parliament fulfills this 
task the following year through the adoption of the Statute of Westminster, whose 
sect. 4 reproduces verbatim the text of the previous year convention45.  
The framework drawn up by the Statute of Westminster is supplemented by 
Sect. 7, dealing with the Imperial Statutes already in force and, through the 
abolition of the CLVA of 1865, enables the legislation of the dominions (and, for 
Canada, the Provinces besides the Federation) to repeal and modify them. The 
only exception, with regard to the Canadian legal system, is the BNA with its 
amendments46. The extension of the principle to this act would have required an 
autonomous constitutional review procedure for the Canadian Constitution, an 
objective that will be achieved only fifty years later with the Patriation of 1982.  
A second significant step is the adoption of an amendment to the Supreme 
Court Act aimed at revoking the appeal jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (JCPC) for the Canadian legal system. As is well known, since 
its establishment in 1833, the judicial power of last resort for all colonies was 
vested in the JCPC. In addition, despite the fact that Canada was granted the 
opportunity to regulate the types of appeal that could be submitted to the JCPC, 
attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the English organ were unsuccessful. This is 
the case of the Memorandum prepared by Justice Minister Edward Blake following 
the establishment of the Supreme Court of Canada47. The memorandum aimed to 
launch a process to revoke the jurisdiction of the JCPC, replacing it with that of 
the newly created court. However, it was rejected without any particular delay 
from the Colonial Office. Again, in 1888, the Canadian Parliament adopted a law 
abolishing the appeal jurisdiction of the JCPC in criminal cases. However, several 
years later, the JCPC declares that the law is null and void for breach of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act48. It is only with the Statute of Westminster that the 
Dominion is entrusted with the power to regulate the subject and then proceed to 
                                                                  
44 See again J.A.R. Marriott, Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth, cit., 305. 
45 It sets out: «No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement 
of this Act shall extend or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that 
Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and 
consented to, the enactment thereof». 
46 See sect. 7.1. of the Statute of Westminister. 
47 The Supreme Court of Canada was established in 1875 by the enactment of the Supreme 
and Exchequer Courts Act. 
48 See Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482. 
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the suppression of the appeal authority of JCPC for the Canadian territory. The 
definitive release of the Canadian judicial system from the Motherland takes place 
in 1949, thanks to the approval of an amendment to the Supreme Court Act of 
1875.  
The importance of such a passage does not seem to need any particular 
explanation. However, with regard to the Canadian legal system, it is of particular 
significance. Under Canadian constitutional law, the dynamics between the 
various legal formants49 – particularly between the legislation and case-law – 
appear to be particularly unbalanced in favor of the work of the Courts50, both for 
the general membership of Canada to the common law countries and the 
fragmentation of the normative formant, and finally for the creative attitude 
shown throughout the years by the PCJC. From this point of view, the case of 
relations between provinces and the Federation seems to be emblematic. The BNA 
text, which also has margins of uncertainty and ambiguity, seems to draw up a 
rather centralized federal system, especially in the area of trade regulation. In spite 
of the literal figures of BNA, the JCPC, especially thanks to the work of Lord 
William Watson and Lord Richard Haldane51, maximizes the provincial 
competences, especially the one on Property and civil rights, and instead offers a 
very restrictive reading of sect. 91 of the BNA52. The consequence is that what 
appears to be a centralized federal system, from the point of view of law in action 
is a system that is particularly attentive to provincial autonomy.  
The relevance of the jurisprudential formant in the definition of 
constitutional law is certainly not a typical circumstance of the Canadian legal 
system alone; however, where the supreme authority of the Judicial System is not 
self-contained but firmly rooted in the UK legal system, the relationship between 
Dominion and Motherland is definitely affected to the benefit of the latter.  
In sum, the period between the Balfour Declaration and 1949 shows that it 
is decisive from the perspective of the independence of the Canadian legal system 
from the Motherland. After 1949, beyond the membership in the Commonwealth, 
the last remnant of colonial supremacy is linked to the adoption of amendments to 
the BNA, which still requires the involvement of the Parliament of Westminster. 
However, this participation is of an eminently formal nature: the adoption by the 
British Parliament of amendments is subject to the Statute of Westminster and is 
therefore fully subject to the political will of the Canadian legislature. 
                                                                  
49 On the concept of legal formants, see R. Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to 
Comparative Law, in 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1991). 
50 J.B. Kelly, C.P. Manfredi, Courts, in J.C. Courtney, D.E. Smith (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Canadian Politics, Oxford, 2010, 39. 
51 On J. Haldane, see: D. Sommer, Haldane of Cloan, London, 1960; J.G. Hall, D.F. Martin, 
Haldane: Statesman, Lawyer, Philosopher, Chichester, 1996; F. Vaughan, Viscount Haldane: The 
Wicked Step-Father of the Canadian Constitution, Toronto, 2010. 
52 See, as leading cases, A.-G. Can. V. A.-G. Alta. (Insurance) [1916] 1 A.C. 588, Re Board of 
Commerce Act [1922] 1 A.C. 191, Toronto Elettric Commissioner v. Snider [1925] A.C 396, and 
The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co. [1925] S.C.R. 434. See also, among new deal cases, 
Natural Products Marketing Reference [1937] A.C. 377. See also E. Mostacci, Commerce power 
e federalizing process. Il governo dell'economia nell'evoluzione dei federalismi di common law, 
Milano, 2018, 114 ff. 
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4. The Patriation process and the re-emergence of the issue of the French-
speaking inhabitants 
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the definitive emancipation of the 
Canadian legal system from the United Kingdom still needs an element that, 
despite being eminently formal in nature, nevertheless has a high symbolic 
significance: the complete and formal reconnection of the constitution to the 
Canadian system of sources of law, with the enactment of an autonomous 
procedure for adopting amendments to the BNA and other constitutional acts.  
It would seem to be a simple process: independence from the UK is a 
politically and legally acquired reality53. However, it still requires more than thirty 
years because of the other great force that has led the evolution of Canadian legal 
system: the constitutional position of the French-speaking minority, now 
declining in the level of autonomy and the constitutional status of the Québec 
province.  
On the other hand, throughout the years the question of the constitutional 
status of Québec did not find a solution, but remained somewhat underdeveloped 
during the first part of the twentieth century, to re-emerge to a very significant 
extent at the beginning of the seventies, as witnessed by the founding of the Parties 
québécois, a party of declared sovereignist inspiration, able to take 23% of the vote 
in the 1970 elections and to reach 41% just six years later54. Beyond the 
achievement of the Quebec Parties, during the seventies the constitutional status 
of Québec became one of the main topics of the provincial political agenda. The 
main political forces of the Province share the need for greater autonomy55 and 
the the very permanent presence of Québec within the Canadian Federation even 
becomes a main political cleavage.  
The relevance of the theme is witnessed in particular by the referendum on 
sovereignty-association put by the Québecois Party leader at the center of its 
political manifesto in the victorious election campaign of 1976 and then convened 
in 1980. Despite the defeat of separatists, in fact, most of the unionist forces, while 
campaigning for the permanence of Quebec in the federation, openly claim that the 
negative vote is not equivalent to a mere approval of the status quo. On the 
contrary, it is the premise of staying in the federation by negotiating new and 
broader margins of autonomy for the Province.  
Beyond the historical context, the definition of an approval procedure for 
constitutional amendments, especially within a federal legal system, is never a 
simple task. It has a significant impact on the role and level of constitutional 
protection of the federal states, as it is capable of modifying the basic provisions 
governing the relationship between center and periphery.  
                                                                  
53 See British Coal Corp. V. The King, [1935] A.C. 500, 520. 
54 After the general election of 1976 René Lévesque, leader of the Parties québécois was 
appointed as Premier of Québec. 
55 A. Noël, Quebec, in J.C. Courtney, D.E. Smith (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics, 
cit., 96 ff. 
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Within the context of the Canadian legal system, the theoretical issue comes 
with the question of Québec56, generating for many years the conviction that all 
Provinces, and in particular Quebec, should consent to the adoption of a procedure 
to approve Constitutional amendments. Thus, a first attempt to enact a self-
constitutional constitutional revision procedure in order to proceed to Patriation, 
comes already to a stop in 1964 against the disagreement of the French-speaking 
province57. Similarly, a second attempt was made in 1971 and failed because of the 
refusal of Québec to ratify. Further proof of the delicacy of the issue, in both cases, 
the proposed procedures provided for extensive involvement of the provinces: 
their unanimous consensus, at least for the most significant changes, according to 
the 1964 proposal; an articulated threshold system – which in any case guarantees 
a veto power to Quebec – in the 1971 proposal.  
The historical context that emerges during the seventies certainly does not 
facilitate reaching an agreement on patriation and an amending formula. It is 
politically difficult to keep separate two seemingly different issues: the reform of 
the constitutional status of Quebec and the definition of a procedure for approving 
the constitutional amendments. Moreover, as early as the 1971 attempt, patriation 
is no longer seen as a mere substitution of the intervention of the Parliament of 
Westminster with a procedure internal to the Canadian legal system. On the 
contrary, the ambition is wider: modernizing the constitution of the country and, 
in particular, providing Canada with a constitutional bill of rights that can replace 
the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960.  
All three of these issues make a very complex picture, in which the room to 
reach an agreement between the Federation, the Anglo-French Provinces and the 
French-speaking province is very narrow. Diametrically opposed needs have to 
find an arduous equilibrium: on the one hand, the demand of Québec for greater 
independence; on the other hand, the definition of a renewed constitutional 
framework that promises to be more pervasive for provinces. In fact, the adoption 
of a federal bill of rights does not limit its effectiveness to the Federation alone: 
the expansive force that rights have taken in the course of the twentieth century, 
coupled with the fundamental unity of federal legal systems, no longer allows to 
imagine Federation and provinces as two distinct and separate spheres; on the 
contrary, as the American constitutional history teaches58, fundamental rights – 
also beyond the intentions of the founding fathers – inform the legal system in its 
entirety and require a positive implementation by the federal and provincial 
government. At the same time, the definition of a bill of rights, as the British 
constitutional experience clearly evidenced, is strongly linked with the history, 
the culture and the juridical-political sensibilities of a citizenry.  
It is not surprising, though, that even in the 1980-1981 period there is no 
agreement between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Likewise the choice of Prime 
                                                                  
56 See D.C.M. Yardley, The Patriation of the Canadian Constitution, in 7 Holdsworth L. Rev. 84, 
87 (1982). 
57 On the Fulton-Favreau Formula, see Scott, Editor’s Diary: The Search for an Amending Process 
(1960-67), in 12 Mc Gill U. 337 (1967). 
58 Through the long process known as incorporation. See H.J. Abraham, B.A. Perry, Freedom 
and the Court, Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States, New York-Oxford, 1998. 
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Minister Trudeau to proceed on the path leading to patriation and with the 
approval of the Canada Act of 1982, despite some attempts to stem the conflict59, 
brings the issue of the constitutional status of Quebec to a particularly difficult 
decade.  
Shortly after the entry into force of the Constitutional Act of 1982, the first 
sign in this sense came into being. In the three-year period 1982-1985, the French-
speaking Province makes a massive use of the notwithstanding clause set out in 
the sect. 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, aiming to emphasize 
its distance from the new constitutional text, both in legal and political terms60.  
In such a context, the arrangement of the francophone issue does not cease 
to dominate the public debate and, between the end of the eighties and the 
beginning of the next decade, two major attempts are made to reach a solution. 
The first, in 1987, came with the Meech Lake Accord61, which succeeded in 
coagulating the consensus of all the Premiers of the ten Provinces and the 
approval by the Legislature of Québec. However, the deal fails for the deadlocks 
that are being created in Manitoba and Newfoundland. The failure of the previous 
agreement leads to a new attempt producing the Charlottetown Accord of 199262. 
However, in this case too the outcome is not the one hoped for: the agreement is 
submitted to a referendum and rejected by the majority of the Canadian people. 
The failure of the attempts to find a solution to the francophone issue leads to the 
second referendum on the sovereignty of Quebec in 1995, when the leavers come 
out with a very small defeat.  
4.1. The Canada Act of 1982 
The Canada Act of 1982 is made up of two fundamental parts. The first aims to 
repeal the sect. 7.1 of the Statute of Westminster, in order to break the bond 
between the two countries left alive in 1931. The second, formally the Schedule B 
of the Canada Act, is the Constitution Act of 1982. It fulfills several key tasks. 
First, sect. 52 sanctions the Primacy of the Constitution of Canada and lists the 
acts that constitute the Constitution and to which the principle of supremacy 
applies. symmetrically, Part V (Sect. 38-49) establishes a general procedure to 
amend the constitutional texts as well as other special procedures. Also, sect. 50 
                                                                  
59 Among these attempts, the Notwithstanding Clause played a significant role: it aimed at 
mitigating the “centripetal aptitude” of the federal Charter of Rights. See J.D. Whyte, 
Sometimes Constitutions are Made in the Streets: The Future of the Charter’s Notwithstanding Clause, 
in 16 Const. F. 79, 82 (2007). 
60 See P. Passaglia, Modello inglese vs. Modello Statunitense nell’edificazione del sistema canadese di 
giustizia costituzionale, in E. Ceccherini (ed.), A trent’anni dalla Patriation canadese, Genova, 
2014, 53 ff. 
61 See D. Owram, The Historical Context of Meech Lake, in 2 Const. F. 23 (1990-1991), and A. 
Tupper, Meech Lake and Democratic Politics: Some Observations, 2 Const. F. 26 (1990-1991). 
Furthermore, on the relationship between the Accord and Canadian constitutional history, see 
R.A. Macdonald, Meech Lake to the Contrary Notwithstanding, Part I, in 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
253 (1991), and Part II, in 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 483 (1991). 
62 P.W. Hogg, The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada, in 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
41 (1993). 
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modifies the BNA – now renamed the Constitutional Act of 1867 – inserting a 
sect. 92A dedicated to provincial jurisdiction on non-renewable natural resources, 
forestry resources and electrical energy. Finally, Part I sets out the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
From a historical point of view, it is to be noted that, in an attempt to prevent 
the opposition of Provinces – in particular the French-speaking one – to the Bill 
of Rights and, more generally, the Canada Act of 1982, sect. 33 of the 
Constitutional Act of 1982 sets out a clause aimed at making the application of a 
relevant part of the bill of right more flexible. The notwithstanding clause allows 
federal and provincial legislatures to subtract, with a specific declaration, a law 
from the scope of sect. 2 or sect. 7 to 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  
This element is of particular interest not only because it gives the country a 
bill of rights whose effectiveness is potentially variable – and it is worth pointing 
out that, apart from the polemical use that has been made by Québec, the 
notwithstanding clause has not been widely applied by Canadian legislatures. On 
the contrary, it is the testimony at the highest normative level of the peculiar 
importance that historical development has had in the progressive formation of 
Canadian constitutional law.  
Beyond this specific peculiarity, the adoption of the Constitutional Act of 
1982 deeply affects the essential features of Canadian constitutional law. 
Following the completion of the patriation process, not only Canada has a 
constitutional bill of rights, but consequences on the relations among the powers 
of the federal government and those between the Federation and Provinces are 
really significant.  
As for the first profile, the role played by the Supreme Court is clearly 
strengthened. The extension of the constitutional parameter does not only result 
in a quantitative increase in the norms imposed on federal and provincial 
legislatures, but also on the nature of the judicial review of legislation, which is no 
longer called upon only to be the guardian of the relationship between center and 
periphery. On the contrary it becomes the defender of the proper exercise of the 
sovereign power by the central body of the frame of government and the political-
representative process. From this perspective, it does not appear incongruous to 
see in the patriation a significant hybridization of the Canadian legal system of 
British derivation with the experience of the United States. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The analysis expounded in the previous pages leads to some conclusive remarks.  
The first element that seems to be highlighted concerns the importance of 
the relationship with the Motherland for the constitutional development of the 
Country: the main stages of the historical process that have been reconstructed 
here have led a significant change in the relationship between Canada and the 
United Kingdom. This is the case, for example, of the development of the 
representative government and of the principle of ministerial responsibility that 
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have gradually marginalized the role of the Governor General, appointed by the 
crown; it is still the case of the progressive granting of new field to Canadian 
legislation and of the symmetrical decrease of the role played by the Parliament of 
Westminster since the adoption of the CLA of 1865 to the Westminster Statute, 
more than half a century later.  
The bond with the homeland and its progressive development have also 
forged numerous institutes of Canadian law – in particular the frame of 
government – and above all the legal culture of the country. As with the patriation 
of 1982 we can speak of a hybridization of the original model with elements that 
characterize the constitutional experience of the U.S.; it should be noted that it has 
been a hybridization rather than an assimilation. Moreover, the idea of binding the 
legislative power to a higher law can be attributed not only to the process of 
hybridization with the United States but also to some features of the relationship 
between the Dominion and the Motherland, starting from the need to respect the 
imperial statutes, as expressly sanctioned by the CLVA of 1865.  
Lastly, the role played by the French-speaking issue should not be 
underestimated. On the one hand, it appears to have forged some elements of 
Canadian federalism, at least through the inclusion of property and civil rights 
within the competences with which provinces are entrusted by sect. 92 of the BNA. 
On the other hand, as highlighted before, the francophone issue significantly 
affected the process of patriation and, at least in part, the results that it achieved. 
Beyond the legal-formal aspects, however, it would seem appropriate to point out 
that the presence of a cohesive and combative French minority has not only 
contributed positively to the development of Canadian constitutional law, but also 
positively affected the context in which the constitution is interpreted and deploys 
its effect, promoting a pluralistic vision of the power and the law63 and a gentle 
approach to traditions and cultural diversities. 
 
                                                                  
63 See D. Schneiderman, Constitutional Culture: A Genealogical Account, in P. Oliver, P. Macklem, 
N. Des Rosiers, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution, cit., 913. 
